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Jurisdictional Fetter on the FTC
The Federal Trade Commission is charged with protecting the
public from unfair or deceptive business practices.1 If a firm engages in
an illegal practice, the Commission may forbid its continued use
through an enforceable order to cease and desist.2 The Commission has
found that the only economical method of enforcement is to seek volun-
tary compliance on an industry-wide basis.3 The industry-wide volun-
tary compliance program is in effect an informal, governmentally im-
1. Federal Trade Commission § 5(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964). This Act, herein.
after referred to as the FTC Act, was enacted in 1914. FTC Act, ch. 311, 88 Stat. 719 (1914).
2. FTC Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964). Section 5 of the Act makes illegal "unfair
methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce," (hereinafter referred to as unfair acts in commerce). "Unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce" were added as categories of illegality in 1988. FTC Act § 5, ch. 49,
52 Stat. 111 (1938). Unfair acts in commerce "does not 'admit of precise definition, . . .
[its] meaning ... must be arrived at by . . . "the gradual process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion.' " FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 312 (1984). Unfair acts include
unethical practices, id. at 818, as well as practices which tend to hinder competition or
create a monopoly, id. at 810-18. While most if not all the activities prohibited by the
Sherman, Clayton, and Robinson-Patman Acts are also unfair acts (cf. id. at 810 n.1), this
Note is primarily concerned with jurisdiction over those unfair acts not otherwise pro.
hibited by federal law. See note 80 infra. These include fraudulent or misleading ad-
vertising, sales techniques, and packaging and the use of lottery devices in the sale of
merchandise. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 880 U.S. 374, 886-87 (1965); FTC v.
R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 804 (1934); Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203 (7th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 861 U.S. 982 (1960), afJ'd on rehearing, 295 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.
1961).
The Commission is directed to issue a complaint if it has reason to believe that an
unfair act has been committed, that it was committed "in commerce," and that a proceed
ing would be in the public interest. FTC Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964). If the case Is
contested, a formal hearing takes place, FTC Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964), generally
conducted by a hearing examiner, FTC Rules of Practice § 3, 16 C.F.R. § 3 (Stipp, 1966).
The hearing examiner files an initial opinion containing findings of law and fact and, if
the requisite findings as to the commission of an unfair act in commerce and public in-
terest are made, issues an initial order to cease and desist. Id. § 8.21(b), 16 C.F.R. § 8.21(b)
(Supp. 1966). Unless a seasonal appeal to the full Commission is filed by the respondent
or the Commission qua complainant, the initial order becomes final. Id. §§ 8.21(a), 3.22, 16
C.F.R. §§ 3.21(a), 3.22 (Supp. 1966). On appeal, the Commission may adopt, modify, or
set-aside the initial opinion and order. Id. § 3.24, 16 C.F.R. § 3.24 (Supp. 1966). Unless the
respondent takes seasonal appeal from the disposition of the Commission, its order be-
comes final. FTC Act § 5(g), 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (1964). If the respondent violates a final order,
he may be made to pay a civil penalty of up to $5,000 for each violation, each day of a
continuing violation being a separate violation. FTC Act § 5(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1964).
3. Address by Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of the FTC, before the Division of Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Law of the American Bar Association, in Montreal, Aug. 10, 1966.
"The very volume of American business would utterly and hopelessly inundate any simple
cops-and-robbers effort by the FTC." Id. 8. When "as frequently happens, the illegality
spreads beyond a manageable toehold .... for the FTC to crack down on it with formal
action would put too great a strain on the Commission's resources" Id. 11 (emphasis
added). "[TMhe 'whipping boy' technique has severe limitations, the principal one being
that too often equally culpable competitors are not at all dismayed to see the whipping
boy slowly tied up by a formal cease-and-desist order while they continue to profit by the
same illegality. If they interpret government's action as 'handwriting on the wall' for
their own sins, they are slow readers." Id. 7.
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posed cartel enforced through the threat of cease and desist orders.4 As
such, it has curbed many undesirable business practices "without the
expense, delay and unavoidable competitive inequities incident to
individual formal complaint proceedings."6i
The industry-wide voluntary compliance program is obviously
clumsy and ineffectual without jurisdiction over all important com-
petitors in a market.6 Yet, since it was held in FTC v. Bunte Bros. that
Congress did not intend to grant jurisdiction over local activities which
affect but are not in interstate commerce,7 local firms are unregulable
even where they compete with interstate concerns. This Note argues
that Bunte Bros. should be limited to the extent necessary to allow the
industry-wide voluntary compliance program to function effectively in
policing interstate firms which compete with local firms. This can be
done without giving the Commission the wide-ranging control of local
business which would follow if its jurisdiction were made coterminous
with the commerce power.
The Statutory Language
Under sections 4 and 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, a cease
and desist order may issue only where a firm has engaged in an
unfair method of competition... [or] unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce [among the several states].8
The phrase "commerce among the several States" is borrowed from
the commerce clause of the Constitution.
4. Id. 8-13. Having found that "most businessmen [wish] to keep their industries'
practices dean," id. 8, and that many violations "have been engendered and nourished by
competitive pressures," id. 10, the Commission employs industry-wide voluntary com-
pliance in order "to provide business with the services it needs for more effective self-
policing," id. 8.
Compliance programs typically begin with a survey of an industry and subsequent
adoption by the Commission of trade practice rules and other guides which identify the
kinds of business behavior which are regarded as violating the law. The Commission
thereafter maintains close contact with the members of the industry to ensure that the
rules and the industry-wide compliance program are understood. Past violators are asked
to stipulate that they will comply with the law under the provisions of FTC Rules of
Practice § 1.21, 16 C.F.R. § 1.21 (Supp. 1965). Report accompanying letter from Paul Rand
Dixon, Chairman of the FTC, to Senator Warren Magnuson, Dec. 21, 1965, at 17-18. The
Commission may also settle the case by asking violators to agree to a consent order which
has the affect, inter se, of a final cease-and-desist order. FTC Rules of Practice § 23, 16
C..R. § 2.3 (Supp. 1966).
5. Report accompanying letter from Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of te FTC, to
Senator Warren Magnuson, Dec. 21, 1965, at 17.
6. Id. 15-16. See p. 1695-96 infra.
7. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941) (6-3 decision).
8. FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). Bracketed material is taken from § 4 of the FTC
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1964), wherein "commerce" is defined as "commerce among the
several States."
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The Congress shall have the power.., to regulate Commerce...
among the several States....
Nonetheless, the Act's language can be interpreted to give the Com-
mission a jurisdiction narrower than that which Congress has the power
to grant.9 According to this view, "commerce among the several States"
means interstate commerce. 10 As the words "in commerce among the
several States" modify unfair act, the Commission may not regulate an
unfair act in intrastate commerce merely because its perpetrator deals
in interstate commerce" or competes with interstate firms.' 2 Yet, Con-
gress plainly could have granted jurisdiction over such unfair acts
simply by using the words "affecting commerce" instead of "in
commerce."' 3
According to another interpretation of "commerce among the several
States" originating with Chief Justice Marshall, the words "in com-
merce" are sufficient to grant a jurisdiction coterminous with the
commerce power.' 4 In this view, "commerce among the several States"
encompasses "that commerce which concerns more states than one."',
Therefore, an unfair act not in the flow of interstate commerce is
regulable if an effect on interstate commerce can be shown.
FTC v. Bunte Bros.
Although the Act was passed in 1914, it was not until 1941 that the
Supreme Court in Bunte Bros. held that Congress intended "commerce
among the several States" to be interpreted narrowly.' 6 Bunte Bros.,
a candy manufacturer, used an unfair method of sales promotion, but
its sales were confined to one state, Illinois. The Commission did not
urge, and had no grounds to urge, that the unfair acts were in interstate
commerce. The Commission rather argued that the unfair acts were "in
commerce" because they injured interstate commerce.17 Convincing
evidence was adduced that Bunte Bros.' continued use of the unfair
practice would directly and substantially reduce interstate candy manu-
9. See Stern, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce, 41 A.BA.J. 823, 825, 873
(1955).
10. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 849, 351 (1941).
11. Canfield Oil Co. v. FTC, 274 F. 571,573-74 (6th Cir. 1921).
12. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
13. Id. at 355. In this view, Congress's power to regulate acts not in interstate com-
merce stems from the doctrine of implied powers or the "necessary and proper" clause.
Stem, supra note 9, at 826.
14. Stern, supra note 9, at 825.
15. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
16. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 351, 355 (1941).
17. Brief for Appellant at 6, FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
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facturers' sales in Illinois insofar as the Commission had ordered these
interstate competitors to desist from the same unfair practice.18
The Court held that "in commerce among the several States" means
"in interstate commerce," not "affecting commerce.""' Consequently,
a mere effect on the sales of interstate competitors is not a sufficient
basis upon which to predicate jurisdiction.20 In finding that Congress
had not exhausted its commerce power in its grant of jurisdiction, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, was swayed by a desire to
preserve "the adjustment of local and national interests in our federal
scheme."21 He feared that
The construction of § 5 urged by the Commission would.., give
a federal agency pervasive control over myriads of local businesses
in matters heretofore traditionally left to local custom or local
law.-2
Therefore, Frankfurter urged a presumption against a federal law
applying to local activities merely affecting interstate commerce not to
be rebutted (1) without a clear manifestation of Congressional intent or
(2) "unless... the purpose of the act will [othenvise] be defeated."2
'
The question of whether Congress had granted to the FTC jurisdic-
tion over those local practices which injure interstate competitors had
not reached the Court before Bunte Bros. largely because, earlier, it was
not entirely clear that Congress itself had the power to grant such
jurisdiction. 24 But, from 1914, the year of the FTC ActO and the
Shreveport Rate Case,20 to 1941, the year of Bunte Bros. and United
States v. Darby,27 the commerce power had gradually grown to reach
acts affecting as well as acts in interstate commerce.28 Thus, although 19
of 20 previous cases treated jurisdiction as a constitutional questioni
18. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 US. 349, 355, 357 (1941) (dissent).
19. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 355 (1941).
20. Id. at 355.
21. Id. at 351.
22. Id. at 354.
23. Id. at 351.
24. Stern, supra note 9, at 825-26.
25. See note 2 supra.
26. Houston, E. & W.T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
27. 312 U.S. 100, 118-24 (1941).
28. Stern, supra note 9, at 825-26.
29. In all cases previous to Bunte Bros., with the exception of California Rice In-
dustry v. FTC, 102 F.2d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 1939), courts treated the jurisdictional question
as a constitutional matter. They never raised the possibility that section 5 was not co-
terminous with the commerce power, they cited constitutional precedents, and they
denied jurisdiction only on the basis that the unfair acts were beyond the reach of the
commerce power. See, e.g., FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927);
General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941);
Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1926); Winslow v.
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Justice Frankfurter could consider their factual holdings reconcilable
with Bunte Bros.30 Frankfurter concluded, in essence, that, without
Congressional approval, judicial re-interpretation of the commerce
clause ought not to lead to a concomitant increase in the jurisdiction
of the Commission.3 1 Thus, Frankfurter seems to have adopted the
traditional notions of the commerce clause of the earlier case law as a
general theory of section 5 jurisdiction.
3 2
The distinction between "in interstate commerce" and "affecting
interstate commerce" is a hard one to make and it is often blurred in
constitutional decisions.33 Since intrastate acts which are a part of an
interstate transaction have long been considered in interstate com-
merce,3 4 "in interstate commerce" can mean "affecting interstate com-
merce" depending upon the meaning given to a part of.35 The earlier
cases held that when an unfair act was committed, its perpetrator's
being engaged in interstate commerce did not place the unfair act itself
"in interstate commerce." 30 Instead, the earlier cases focused on the
origin of the goods involved in the unfair act. If the goods involved had
not yet "come to rest" from their interstate journey, an unfair act
within a single state was held to be a part of an interstate transaction. 1
Thus, in dealing with unfair acts taking place wholly in one state,
courts looked to whether the goods had "come to rest," not whether the
perpetrator was engaged in interstate commerce.
The Present Jurisdictional Test
While in no case since 1941 has jurisdiction been asserted on theories
contrary to Bunte Bros.' holding, courts have upheld the Commission
on theories inconsistent with Bunte Bros.' general theory of section 5.81
In Holland Furnace v. FTC and several other cases involving activities
of local branches of firms with sales outlets in many states, courts have
held that the Commission may regulate even those local branches which
act in the capacity of a local retailer if their activities affect the firm's
FTC, 277 F. 206 (4th Cir. 1921); Canfield Oil Co. v. FTC, 274 F. 571 (6th Cir. 1921),
Ward Baking Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 330 (2d Cir. 1920).
30. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 351-52, 352 n.3 (1941), and cases cited note 29
supra.
31. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 355 (1941).
32. Id. at 351, 352, 352 n.3.
33. Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED. B.J. 282,
286-87 (1965).
34. FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 64 (1927); Chamber of Com
merce of Minneapolis v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673, 684 (8th Cir. 1926).
35. Eiger, supra note 33, at 286-87.
36. Canfield Oil Co. v. FTC, 274 F. 571,573-74 (6th Cir. 1921).
37. See cases cited note 34 supra.
38. Cases cited notes 39-41 infra.
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own interstate business.39 As jurisdiction is bottomed on the interstate
nature of the perpetrator, 40 and on an "effect" on interstate commerce,4 '
the conflict with Bunte Bros.' general theory of jurisdiction is clear.
Holland Furnace, however, does not purport to overrule the holding of
Bunte Bros. that jurisdiction may not be based on an effect on a com-
petitor's interstate business. 42 Nor does it purport to include within the
Commission's jurisdiction unfair acts of a firm with sales outlets in only
39. Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied. 361 US.
932 (1965), aff'd on rehearing, 295 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1961); cases cited notes 40-41 infra.
In Holland Furnace, the respondent manufactured furnaces in one state and distributed
them in 44 others. It sought to avoid FTC jurisdiction over the unfair and deceptive sales
technique used by its own door-to-door salesmen by setting up separate warehouses and
sales organizations in each state and by filling every order from a warehouse in the state
of sale. The company urged that since each furnace was in inventory before the unfair
acts connected with its sale were committed, the FTC lacked jurisdiction because the
furnaces had "come to rest." The court, however, upheld jurisdiction on two theories,
discussed in notes 40 and 41 infra.
40. The court found jurisdiction on the theory that there is "no logical point between
shipment ... and delivery of Holland's products through its employees to the ultimate
consumer when ... [the furnaces] cease to be in interstate commerce." Holland Furnace v.
FTC, 269 F.2d 203, 210 (7th Cir. 1959). Previously, however, warehousing in the state
where an unfair act occurred was considered to bring the goods to rest, whether or not
the perpetrator was an interstate firm. Canfield Oil v. FTC, 274 F. 571, 573-74 (6th Cir.
1921); Ward Baking Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 330 (2d Cir. 1920). The court, in Holland Furnace,
however, rejected warehousing as the point where the goods came to rest because Hol-
land's interstate shipments were dependent upon its own sales effort which followed
warehousing. Holland Furnace v. FTC, supra at 210. Therefore, Holland Furnace sets up
a separate test for goods coming to rest in cases where the sales outlet is owned by the
interstate shipper. Thus, jurisdiction depends upon whether the sales outlet is interstate
in nature, not whether the goods had come to rest according to traditional tests.
Sun Oil Co. v. FTC extended Holland Furnace to cases where a manufacturer with a
multi-state distribution system engages in unfair acts in only one state. 350 F.2d 624 (7th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 US. 982 (1966).
41. Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203, 212-13 (7th Cir. 1959). Alternatively,
the court found that Holland's sales activities "had such a dose and substantial relation-
ship to interstate commerce as to bring them within the . . . jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission." Id. at 213. In other words, a firm's activities in intrastate commerce
are regulable if they have a strong enough effect on its own interstate business. Thus,
while Bunte Bros. holds that jurisdiction may not be based on an effect on a competitor's
interstate business, Holland Furnace holds that jurisdiction may be based on an effect on
one's own interstate business. On this ground, Holland Furnace cites and follows Ford
Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 183 (6th Cir. 1941).
The Commission has urged that this ground brings within its jurisdiction the local
sales activities of a firm distributing in many states although the goods sold never travel
bet:ween states. Bakers of Washington, 5 TRADE Rac. RE'. 17,147 (FTC Dkt. 8309, 1964),
aff'd on other grounds, sub nor. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 US. 932 (1967). Jurisdiction was based on the dose and substantial
relationship between the sales efforts of the local branch and the interstate financial and
management activities of the interstate corporate owners. This is dearly contrary to the
traditional view that jurisdiction must be grounded on the interstate nature of the unfair
act, not of the respondent's business. Canfield Oil v. FTC, 274 F. 571 (6th Cir. 1921).
Nonetheless, it would be difficult to distinguish Bakers of Washington and Holland Fur-
nace for interstate finandal and management activities are as much interstate commerce
as interstate shipments of goods. In both cases, the interstate activity was wholly de-
pendent upon the sales efforts of the local branch.
42. Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203,210 (7th Cir. 1959).
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one state merely because it engages in interstate commerce in procuring
its supplies.
48
As to firms with sales outlets in only one state, all cases since Bunte
Bros. have involved unfair acts which were part of interstate commerce
in the sense of the pre-Bunte Bros. cases.44 Jurisdiction will be upheld
where the unfair act itself takes place across state lines.45 It is no defense
that the immediate impact of the interstate unfair act will be felt only
in intrastate commerce. 46 Jurisdiction also will be upheld if the unfair
act takes place wholly within one state but is part of a transaction in
interstate commerce .47 The transaction is considered to be in interstate
commerce, first, if it takes place across state lines.48 Second, an otherwise
local transaction is in interstate commerce if it involves goods which
had not yet "come to rest."49 This may occur if a sales contract made
with the use of unfair methods is executed by subsequently ordering
goods from an out of state source. 0 Third, an otherwise local transac-
43. While the holding is not explicity limited to firms which distribute in several
states, the court emphasized the national character of Holland Furnace's business and
distinguished Bunte Bros. on this ground. Id. at 210. While the grounds for jurisdiction
discussed in note 41 supra can be read to cover a firm with, for instance, management and
procurement facilities in one state and warehousing and sales outlets in another, the
logical cut-off seems to be multistate distribution. Otherwise, it would be difficult to
distinguish the local drugstore which orders goods from the catalogue of an out of state
wholesaler.
44. Cases cited notes 45-51 infra.
45. The following interstate acts have been held to be commerce: Advertising: Colgate.
Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962), aff'd on other grounds, 380 U.S. 374
(1965); Bankers Securities Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961); Progressive Tailoring
Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1946). Services: FTC v. Civil Service Training Bureau,
Inc., 79 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1935). Shipment of lottery devices as part of scheme to make
interstate sales of merchandise: Peerless Products, Inc. v. FTC, 284 F.2d 825 (7th Cir,
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 844 (1961); Rosten v. FTC, 263 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1959), Sey-
mour Sales Co. v. FTC, 216 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 928 (1955).
Fraudulent requests for information to be used in collection of bad debts: National
Clearance Bureau v. FTC, 255 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1958); Rothschild v. FTC, 200 F.2d 39
(7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953); Bernstein v. FTC, 200 F.2d 404 (9th Cir.
1952). Price Fixing Conspiracy: FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
46. Lichtenstein v. FTC, 194 F.2d 607 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 819 (1952);
Globe Cardboard Novelty v. FTC, 192 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1951); Chas. Brown & Sons v.
FTC, 158 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1946). Lichtenstein, Globe Cardboard, and Chas. Brown & Sons
upheld jurisdiction over interstate shipment of lottery devices to be used in sales
promotion in intrastate commerce. Salt Producers' Ass'n v. FTC, 174 F.2d 354
(7th Cir. 1943) (interstate price conspiracy to fix price of salt sold in intrastate commerce).
See American News v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962) (inter-
state chain of newsstands buying and selling magazines in intrastate commerce induces
discriminatory rebate from national publisher). Cf. S. Klein, 57 FTC 1543 (1960), com-
plaint dismissed without explanation, 60 FTC 388 (1962) (advertising in interstate media
by store selling only in intrastate commerce). The point at issue in S. Klein is potentially
of great importance. Note, Interstate Dissemination of Advertising: Jurisdiction Which
Must Be Earned, 38 IND. L.J. 455 (1963).
47. Cases cited in notes 48-51 infra.
48. Consumers Home Equipment Co. v. FTC, 164 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1947).
49. Ashville Tobacco Board of Trade v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959) (unfair acts
in the course of the operation of a commodity market).
50. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n v. FTC, 273 U.S. 52 (1927) (pre-Bunte Bros. case).
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don is in interstate commerce if subsequent interstate shipment of the
goods sold in the transaction is contemplated. This occurs mainly where
the firm services a multi-state market through a large retail outlet
located near a state border. Although the sale took place wholly within
one state, the firm could foresee that a number of customers were likely
to take or ship the goods across state lines.-
In sum, a firm servicing a one-state market is immune to regulation
so long as any goods of interstate origin are within the state before the
unfair act takes place and the facilities of interstate commerce are not
used in perpetrating the unfair act.52 Thus, most concerns with a one
state market are immune. Under the unchallenged holding of Bunte
Bros., such a firm is not regulable simply because it competes with
interstate firms.
Bunte Bros." Impact on Enforcement
The holding in Bunte Bros. was based on the assumption that deny-
ing jurisdiction over local competitors of interstate firms would not
frustrate the purpose of the act.53 This assumption is erroneous today
when the Commission relies so heavily on industry-wide voluntary
compliance.54 This is well illustrated by a typical set of examples:
1) The Harris Rug Company 5 sells carpeting door-to-door in New
Orleans and Southern Mississippi. Harris' sales techniques in Missis-
sippi, but not Louisiana, are regulable"0 because sales contracts are
filled from a New Orleans warehouse. Harris and other interstate firms
compete in the Mississippi market with several wholly local firms
which, under Bunte Bros., are not regulable. 7 Most of these firms sell
good quality carpeting at less than the usual store prices. But all employ
the unfair practice of misrepresenting the carpeting's usual retail
price.58 The Commission has recently requested Harris and the other
interstate firms to stop this deceptive practice in the Mississippi market.
51. Bankers Securities Corp. v. FTC, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961).
52. Since all of the 29 jurisdictional cases since Bunte Bros. which reached the courts
of appeal were decided in the Commission's favor, it is difficult to state precisely what is
not regulable.
53. See p. 1691 supra.
54. See notes 3-5 supra.
55. Harris' name, product, and market have been altered, but in other respects this
example is real.
56. Cases cited notes 43 & 50 supra; Hill Bros. v. FTC, 9 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1929
(dictum).
57. Harris may not defeat FTC jurisdiction by showing it competes with unregulable
firms. Royal Oil Corp. v. FTC, 262 F.2d 741,744 (4th Cir. 1959).
58. The court held that this is an unfair practice in Bankers Securities Corp. v. FTC,
297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961).
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Harris is presented with two unattractive choices: comply or litigate.
Harris would be willing to comply but for the prospect of losing busi-
ness to the unregulable Mississippi firms. Furthermore, if deprived of
their normal sales pitch, Harris' salesmen, who are paid on a commis-
sion basis, will switch to the Mississippi firms. On the other hand,
Harris could buy a few extra years of higher profits by litigating.
The situation is no happier from the Commission's point of view. If
Harris decides to fight, all of its interstate competitors probably will as
well. The Commission may then drop the enforcement program be-
cause its limited resources can be better spent where market-wide volun-
tary compliance can be achieved with only the threat of a formal pro-
ceeding.59 If Harris and its interstate competitors comply, voluntarily
or after litigation, the Commission has achieved little. Harris will con-
centrate on the New Orleans market where the unfair practice can
continue unchecked. Meanwhile, the interstate firms will lose many
sales in Mississippi to their local competitors who continue the unfair
practice. In either event, the public has received little protection.
2) In contrast, neither discrimination against regulable firms nor
inadequate consumer protection results when the Commission has juris.
diction over all the competitors in the market. In the District of
Columbia, where the Commission has jurisdiction over all firms, the
discount furniture stores customarily misrepresented usual retail prices
in newspaper advertisements. The Commission requested all of them
to cease this unfair practice. Each complied without litigation because
their competitors could be forced to comply.60
Unfortunately, the Harris Rug example is not an isolated case.
Enforcement often is hindered where regulable and unregulable firms
compete. Such competition occurs in many types of markets.
1. A manufacturer, mail order house, or door-to-door sales company
distributing in one state competing with firms distributing in
several states,
2. A local retailer or wholesaler competing with the local branch of
an interstate firm, and
3. A local retailer drawing customers from one state competing with
a store drawing customers from several states.
59. Note the list of factors cited in the Report accompanying the letter from Paul
Rand Dixon, Chairman of the FTC, to Senator Warren Magnuson, Dec. 21, 1965, at 14.15.
If the Commission allocates its given resources to maximize compliance, it would be ex.
pected not to police relatively small markets where litigation is likely. Once a compliance
program has begun and the prospect of litigation arises, however, it may proceed anyway,
in order to maintain its credibility.
60. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 3.
1696
Vol. 76: 1688, 1967
Fetter on the FTC
The Commission considers the lack of jurisdiction over local com-
petitors of regulable firms a serious problem, yet has found no work-
able, general solution. A commentator noted in 1961 that
The Commission has recently expressed an intent to police the
local competitior where its activities interfere with Commission
efforts to stop questionable methods on an industry-wide basis.6 '
The Commission has, in fact, often gained jurisdiction over ostensibly
local firms on the basis of inconsequential amounts of interstate sales.'
But such technical grounds for jurisdiction can be found in only a
limited number of cases.
In 1965, the Commission attempted to cope with the problem by
encouraging states to regulate the local competitor.0 Chairman Paul
Rand Dixon indicated that the Commission had appointed an Assistant
General Counsel for Federal-State Cooperation in order to
provide more adequate governmental protection against [local]
selling practices which victimize ... the honest competitor
by closing the gap between Federal and State regulatory activity.6r
While this intergovernmental cooperation is commendable, it pro-
vides no solution. The states still show little interest in enacting or
enforcing legislation commensurate to the Federal Trade Commission
Act passed over a half century ago. O' Even if state enforcement were
adequate, however, industry-wide voluntary compliance programs in
markets where regulable and unregulable firms compete would be diffi-
cult to implement because they would require the continuous agree-
ment and coordination of the FTC and one, or perhaps many, state
agencies.
The Commission has not sought to solve the problem by urging that
Bunte Bros. be limited. This probably stems from a desire to maintain
its record of having won each of the 29 jurisdictional cases since Bunte
Bros. The Commission, by thus avoiding a precise definition of its juris-
diction, has maintained its ability to bluff firms into voluntary com-
pliance in questionable cases.66 Nonetheless, the Commission would
61. McKinney, The FTC is Eyeing Local Business Activity,, 49 ILL. B.J. 734, 740 (1961).
62. E.g., Safeway Stores Inc. v. FTC, 366 F.2d 795,798-99 (9th Cir. 1966).
63. FTC News Release, July 7, 1966, and April 3, 1965, and statement of Senator
Harrison Williams attached to FTC News Release of April 8, 1965.
64. Report accompanying letter from Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman of the FTC, to
Senator Warren Magnuson, Dec. 21, 1965, at 38.
65. Although a surge of state interest has been reported, state laws arc generally far
less strict and are enforced less strenuously. Id. 37.
66. A violator's belief that the Commission has a reasonable chance of succeeding in
formal proceedings is naturally crucial in inducing voluntary compliance through in-
formal methods.
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appear to have a good chance of success, even within the terms of
Frankfurter's canon of statutory interpretation. 7 First, Bunte Bros. at
least partially frustrates the purpose of the Act. Second, there is com-
pelling evidence, for some reason never used in the Bunte Bros!
opinions or briefs, that Congress actually did intend to grant jurisdic-
tion coterminous with the commerce power.
Legislative History
The original bills passed by the House and Senate defined commerce
as "such commerce as Congress has the power to regulate."0 s If this
language had been retained by the Conference committee, there would
be no question that jurisdiction was meant to be coextensive with the
commerce power. The Conference bill, however, changed the definition
to read:
"Commerce" means commerce among the several States [and com-
merce relating to foreign countries and certain territories].0 D
Yet the debates,70 together with the report of the House Conference
managers, 71 imply that the change was made solely to exclude Guam,
the Canal zone, and the Philippines from jurisdiction. Furthermore,
if Congress intended to restrict jurisdiction, the words "commerce
among the several States" were poorly suited to its purpose. Only a year
before, the Supreme Court had reiterated Chief Justice Marshall's
statement from Gibbons v. Ogden that "commerce among the several
States" includes "that commerce which concerns more states than
one." 72 Also, at the time, the Sherman Act language, "restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States," was read to be coterminous
with the commerce power.73 Furthermore, if Congress intended to limit
jurisdiction, it could have easily achieved this purpose by using lan-
guage such as "commerce between any of the several States."74 Frank-
furter's insistence on the use of "affecting commerce" to grant jurisdic-
67. See p. 1691 supra.
68. H.R. REP. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 13 (1914).
69. Id. 2.
70. 51 CONG. REc. 14927 (1941) (remarks of Congressmen Sherley and Covington), 14935
(remarks of Congressmen Willis and Stevens).
71. H.R. REP. No. 1142 supra note 68, at 18.
72. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824); The Minnesota Rate Cases,
230 U.S. 352, 393 (1913).
73. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 175-76, 180 (1911).
Also, several pre-Bunte Bros. cases stated that § 5 jurisdiction extends over acts which
merely affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, 13 F.2d 673,
684 (8th Cir. 1926).
74. Such language is used in 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
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tion coextensive with the commerce power mistakes the language
thought necessary at the time to convey this meaning.
Conclusion
While the legislative history provides sufficient basis for reading the
grant of jurisdiction broadly, it is unlikely that the Court would com-
pletely overrule Bunte Bros. To do so would, under recent interpreta-
tions of the commerce power, give the Commission jurisdiction over
almost all business.75 Even if the Commission desired such a wide
domain, it lacks the manpower to police it.70 In addition, such a drastic
increase in jurisdiction goes well beyond what is needed to achieve an
effective voluntary compliance program. For instance, jurisdiction is
not needed over the many local firms which affect commerce only
through buying goods of interstate origin or supplying goods to persons
or firms engaged in interstate commerce. Nor is jurisdiction required
over all competitors of presently regulable firms.7 The Commission
should therefore urge that Bunte Bros. be limited, but only to the
extent necessary to get jurisdiction over those local competitors which
must be regulated to achieve an effective voluntary compliance pro-
gram.
The Shreveport Rate Case"8 provides a useful test with which to
identify these local competitors. There it was held that intrastate com-
merce could be regulated
Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions . . . are so
related that the government of one involves the control of the
other .... 79
Analogously, the Commission should be allowed to prohibit unfair
practices in intrastate commerce where their continued use is likely to
frustrate the industry-wide voluntary compliance program in stopping
or deterring unfair acts in interstate commerce. The Commission could
determine the likelihood of a local firm's unfair practice affecting the
behavior of the interstate firm by looking to such factors as the size of
the loss which the unfair practice's continued use would inflict on the
honest competitor and the importance of this loss to his overall profits.
75. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,299 (1964).
76. The less than four million dollars currently allocated to consumer protection allow
only selective enforcement. 1965 FTC ANN. RE.P. 2, 11.
77. Jurisdiction would not be needed over competitors whose unfair acts inflict only
insubstantial losses on regulable firms.
78. Houston, E. & V. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 350-55 (1914).
79. Id. at 351.
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This test would therefore exclude local competitors from regulation
unless the unfair practices actually used seriously damaged presently
regulable firms.80
Stare decisis should be no obstacle to upholding jurisdiction over
local competitors where necessary for effective functioning of the in-
dustry-wide voluntary compliance program. Bunte Bros. might be dis-
tinguished on the theory that it was neither alleged nor shown there
that that jurisdiction over the local competitor was necessary to regulate
the interstate firms. Rather, the Commission sought jurisdiction over
all local business which injures interstate commerce.81 If Bunte Bros.
is not thought to be distinguishable, there is good cause to overrule it.
Experience has shown that the rule of Bunte Bros., in connection with
such changing conditions as the Commission's greatly increased reliance
on industry-wide voluntary compliance, has often made enforcement
impossible.8 2 On the other hand, no identifiable group has relied on
Bunte Bros.s3 Nor would the respondent firm in the limiting case be
victimized, since the resultant cease and desist order would have only
prospective application.8 4 Not limiting Bunte Bros. to the extent sug-
gested here would seem inconsistent with Holland Furnace and related
cases which have, for reasons of sound policy, upheld jurisdiction over
local business activity which affects interstate commerce in a particular
well-defined way. 5
Section 5 of the Act can properly be interpreted to grant jurisdiction
over the local competitor whose continued use of an unfair practice
frustrates industry-wide enforcement. Such an interpretation extends
the FTC's jurisdiction only marginally and does not unduly upset the
"proper adjustment of the local and national interests in our federal
scheme."88
80. Although § 5 incorporates the public policy of the Sherman, Clayton, and Robin.
son-Patman Acts, (note 2 supra), this suggested increase in § 5 jurisdiction would not
indirectly increase the sweep of these other laws as the industry-wide voluntary compli-
ance program is directed mainly at deceptive practices, Report from Paul Rand Dixon to
Senator Magnuson, supra note 64, at 17, which are not violations of other federal
legislation.
81. Brief for Petitioner at 6, FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
82. See notes 3-6 supra.
83. Courts are particularly likely to adhere to stare decisis where an identifiable group
has acted in reliance on the precedent. Cf. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 856,
357 (1953).
84. FTC Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
85. See cases cited in notes 39-41 supra.
86. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1941).
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